THE DRAGON BREATHES ON NECK, AS WE LOOK EAST

By Manas Paul

Is India with her 'intensified engagement' in South East Asia through 'Look East Policy', capable enough of effectively facing the increased Chinese strategic options in the region and in Indian Ocean?

As Sudhir Devare former Ambassador and Secretary to MEA who was also actively involved in formulating the much ambitious Look East policy pointed out, this policy has two important components- socio-political and strategic. He had pointed out that the strategic imperatives -which would include traditional and non-traditional security, maritime security, economic interdependence, energy security, human security etc -would also pave the way for greater dialogue and cooperation among the countries concerned. And, he felt, going by her strong presence already in place in this region India could very well meet the Chinese initiatives.

However, Devare, who recently visited Tripura central University and held media interaction on Wednesday (25 August 2010) , felt that in pursuing this policy, India is actually rediscovering its 'eastern identity. He sought to tone down the strategic threat in the region that emerges from the growing Chinese maritime efforts in the Indian Ocean.

"We need not to be unnecessarily concerned at the Chinese initiatives and efforts in the region. We have adequate naval strength in the Indian Ocean", he said adding that despite disputes and suspicions at some areas New Delhi and Beijing can still carry on dialogue at larger Indo-China relations and cooperation.

"Our Look East policy is not directed against anybody or responsive to Chinese initiatives".

Devare maintained that the 'Look East' approach-which brought 'a direct interface for Northeast region with Myanmar and Bangladesh'- should be seen on the backdrop of the broad political situation, and rapid as well as sustained economic growth especially in infrastructure and consumer goods in the Asia-Pacific with an aim for regional integration within Asia.

Devare said, 'Look East Policy's one of the most important component was dialogue among Southeast Asian countries, both bilaterally and regionally at ASEAN level. For India it would also provide a useful opportunity to interact at regional platform, namely the ASEAN'.

But despite this hope facts stand today, in the Look East policy that the security imperatives in the policy were not expressive enough -at least as far as countering the aggressive Han Chinese initiatives in the region -specially its Blue Water ambitions -are concerned. In fact, so far, virtually except the RITE's Sittwe port construction in Myanmar -that would follow Kaladan river project to give an opening to North East India's Mizoram to the South East Asia, there was not much headway in infrastructure creation to implement the Look East Policy.

On the other hand China is actively and aggressively involved in adding one after another pearl to its 'String of Pearl' policy. A cursory look at the Chinese options in the region would make it amply clear that the Dragon is indeed breathing down on the Tiger's neck.

China had, for the last few years, been trying to strengthen its presence in South East Asia especially in creating infrastructures and increasing its trade and foreign investment relations. But, behind the economic initiatives there is clearly a strategic and military ambition on the part of Beijing for strengthening its maritime presence in the Indian Ocean.

China at present is actively involved in 1200 miles long oil and gas pipeline from Myanmar's Kyaukpyu Port on the Bay of Bengal to southwest China. The pipelines will cross Kunming in Yunnan Province and pass through Guizhou province to Chongqing in southwest China. Besides, China will also upgrade Kyaukpyu port in Arakan.

For China the Myanmarese port of Kyaukpyu port is also strategically important. Through this port Beijing will be able to import natural gas and oil from the Middle East and Africa - the two countries that supply about 85 percent of its oil demand. The Myanmar project will also help Beijing gain direct foray into the Indian Ocean avoiding Malacca Strait where Indian strategic presence is strong, and the South China Sea as well.

(The USA contested the Chinese sole claim on South China Sea. The USA needs the sea to be out of Chinese influence for free movement of its ships and aircraft. China's dispute with Vietnam over South China Sea is also a major issue for Beijing).

Apart from Myanmar China is also taking active interest in Bangladesh developing Chittagong Port and a deep sea port at Sonadia Island at the Bay of Bengal. But the most ambitious strategic Chinese project that is being envisaged is the proposed Bangladesh road link that would connect Chittagong to Kunming in Yunnan via Gumdum in Myanmar and would also bypass Malacca Strait.

As the present Awami League government in Bangladesh kept open its option for Chinese assistance, Beijing is also likely to fund for Pagla Water Treatment Plant and the Shahjalal Fertiliser Factory as well as development of telecommunication sector there. Foreign Minister Dipu Moni was recently reported to have commented that China assured more investment in Bangladesh, and was ready to 'reduce the bilateral trade imbalance'. In that case Beijing will also include more Bangladeshi products to have duty-free access to China.

Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is also reported to have taken open interest in Chinese investments in her country.

While China is presently actively involved in exploring and strengthening its business and Indian Ocean centric strategic possibilities in Myanmar and Bangladesh, it has already gained strong foot hold in Hambantota in southern part of Sri Lanka and in Gawador in Pakistan. China is already engaged developing a massive port in Hambantota which will give Beijing a strong presence in the Indian Ocean while the already developed Gawador gave the Chinese direct access to the Arabian Sea.

The Hambantota project is estimated to be of US $ one billion and will be completed by 2023. Beijing claims that Hambantota would not be turned into a Chinese naval base but in case of Gawador in Pakistan China is keen to refuel and re-stock its ship to be deployed in Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden.

The Look East policy clearly did not have matching security imperatives in it.

KILLING WITH A HUMAN FACE

By Manas Paul

"I have never killed a man, but I have read many obituaries with great pleasure." Clarence Darrow.

As a seminar on Human rights violations in Counter Insurgency Operations gets underway in Prajna Bhawan organized by Tripura Police and Institute of Social Science from today (August 4, 2010) where police officials at various ranks would be discussing one of the most convoluted yet most difficult tasks they face at field level operations, some points also need public appreciation.

Tripura being one of the three states after Mizoram and Punjab where peace returned after decades old armed conflicts is perhaps the right place for holding such a seminar on the important civil right issue. Because it is here that despite bloody engagements for years together the rate of Human Rights violations is extremely low- barring two glaring examples of Ujan Maidan in 1989 and Kutnabari in 1999.

The title of the seminar ‘Human Rights in Counter Insurgency’ first needs clarification. Expectedly the seminar would not confine its deliberations to Tripura only but would dwell extensively with global and national perspectives at backdrop.

But when the word ‘Insurgency’ is used one must keep in mind that in Tripura the armed violence committed by a section of tribal youths since early eighties never graduated to ‘Insurgency’ in its classical connotation. So, in Tripura perspective the title Human Rights in Counter Insurgency would be ‘misplaced’ if not altogether a misnomer.

There are clear parameters to define ‘insurgency’, ‘terrorism’ and ‘militancy’. And as such the task of maintaining Human Rights while dealing with various forms of violent insurrections or acts by non-state actors is shaped by different levels of personal and institutional understanding of the ground situations and restraints.

The question of quantum of force while dealing with the non-state armed actors in field level, especially when it calls for an instantaneous decision, is, indeed, a difficult task for men in uniform. That it poses real dilemma for the security and police officials and personnel was clearly stated by none other than the Chief Justice of Gauhati High Court M B Lokur himself in his key note address in the inaugural session of the seminar. The CJ did neither delve deep into the dilemma nor did he touch upon the various forms of armed violence.

But Human Rights issue is, perhaps, the most important factor in any conflict zone and in dealing with non-state armed actors due to such ‘dilemma’ security personnel or policemen can end up in taking wrong decision resulting in blatant infringement of human rights. The basic idea of Human Rights warrants that it cannot even be denied to the people even if they are engaged in posing serious threat to human life and dignity and civil security in general. In this context it is imperative that we should understand the different meanings and characters of the ‘insurgency’, 'terrorism’ and 'militancy' at first and inherent problems-dilemma- that might come in taking strategic as well as instantaneous decisions for combating the menace.

For example, the reflex and reactions of the security forces or police acting against a Maoist rebel ready to fight the representatives of the ‘oppressive Indian state’ will definitely be, and expected to be, different than his reactions against a Jihadi or Fidayen terrorist from Pakistan or some Afghan mountain who, armed with explosive vests and AKs, is set to indiscriminate manslaughter and kill as many innocents as possible before blowing himself up to his heaven and hurries. Practically, the same security man or police will have different sets of restraint levels and thus at the end different explanations of sacredness of Human Rights.

Coming back to the connotations of armed violence, ‘insurgency’ has been characterised by several parameters. Among them five important factors are:

It is an armed violence committed by a disgruntled section of the society that was till recently been an integral part of the system.


Guided by ideological or strong ethno-centric motivation, they take up arms to fight against the power that be, alien powers included.


They should have a clear, well defined political and armed command structure and hierarchy


They should have some popular support at local level as well as in other sections of the society like intelligentsia, NGOs and pressure groups


And they should have a liberated zone that they seek to expand continuously among others until they capture state power or secede from the homogenous land or drive out others from it

In that sense Maoists in India and Nepal very well fit in the category.

Terrorism - is certainly a broad and all encompassing word that remains in use since the time of Jacobean period of France. In fact from the time of Robespierre there were hundreds of people Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot to Rwandan or Yugoslavian characters who had resorted to terror tactics to eliminate whomever they felt were in opposition. But, of late, terrorism in Indian context is used to Jihadi terrorism abetted, aided and exported to India from Pakistan. The terrorism of Jihadi kind can be determined by some obvious factors. Broadly they are:

They do not have any clear cut political and armed hierarchy. Al Qaeda is actually a ‘Base’ and it formed the International Islamic Front (IIF) in 1998 with several member organizations. The IIF members or for that matter non-member Islamic Jihadi outfits were free to operate and launch terror campaign on their own at their local levels and were also allowed to transport their terrorists to any other country to commit operations.


Jihadi terrorists are guided by staunch Wahabi Islamic ideology to create a Dar-ul-Islam (Islamic world) which is not limited to any political boundary of a nation state or country. They are not disgruntled group but brainwashed and indoctrinated zombies picked up from backwater localities as well as from important universities. They come from all possible strata of life - Osama Bin Laden from Wealthy Arabian family, an Egyptian doctor Ayman Al Zwahari, an educated engineer in the name of Mohammed Atta from Germany, to a Taliban from rustic Afghan or SWAT province in Pakistan or Sudan.


Their sworn enemies are infidels belonging to non - Islamic faiths like the Jews, Christians, Hindus etc. But in their operations they do not target - like insurgents- specifically but prefer to kill by way of mercenary attacks or bomb explosions or by any violent means as many as possible to undermine the governments run or influenced by infidels.


They, however, are not inclined to capture political power


And their operations are neither confined to any specific areas or boundary and nor there is any scope for any peace negotiations with them.

On the other hand the militancy is characterized by violent activities committed by a group of disgruntled people who feel that they should have their own areas of self determination and rule in their ethno centric homogenous political area. The broad characteristics of the militants are :

Militants function in particular areas of their influence

They mainly target-like insurgents, representatives of the government in power


But unlike insurgents they are neither guided by any motivation to capture the state power in the entire country and put in place a particular ideologically guided government

More often their fight-due to their ethno-centric characters- ultimately boils down to communal confrontations and the targeted victims become their immediate neighbours outside their own ethnic community

There is always scope for peace and political negotiations with them and arrival at a long lasting settlement. And as such militants who once carried out armed violence can very well be absorbed in the society and be allowed to participate in overall development activities.

Considering all these characters North East India’s armed organizations are by and large militants. It is true that some of the North east militants speak of ‘Socialism’ (NSCN) and communism ( Meitei outfits like Kangleipak Communist party or the UNLF-an offshoot of Red Guards led by Hijam Irabot) but in all practical purposes there is no effective influence of their declared ‘Socialist’ or ‘Communist’ values.

As far as Tripura is concerned the violence committed by the armed outfits right from TNV, ATPLO, to NLFT, ATTF was never in true sense ‘insurgency’. The armed outfits of Tripura did never have four important characteristics of insurgency i.e popular support, a liberated zone, well defined and highly motivated politico-armed command structures and ideological and political motivations. They are virtually a blend of criminal elements led by some unscrupulous greedy people and are fuelled by strong communal hatred for their neighbours. Their leaders talked to freeing Tripura from the clutch of ‘Hindu Bengalis’ who outnumbered the tribals following partition and resultant influx from erstwhile East Pakistan, committed brutalities in all imaginable forms on the unarmed civilians including their own people and in the process made huge money and started business in foreign countries. The leaders who wanted to become ‘President’ of sovereign Tripura and indulged in violence and man slaughters ultimately find it was more rewarding to become a ‘chairman’ of a government run corporation.

So, despite popular usages in battle strategies formulated by the state as well as in media reports- the ‘Counter Insurgency’ would be a 'misnomer' as far as Tripura is concerned.

Yet, coming back to Human Rights in Counter Insurgency campaign, it is beyond any question that the engagements between the state force and non-state armed actors are inherently fraught with threat of Human Rights violations, as instantaneous decisions by the force in uniform could very well go astray in a conflict zone. The militants do neither care for Human Rights nor are ready to practice it in any form. In reality ultimate success or sporadic achievements of their policies and operations are based exclusively on Human Rights violations only.

In India we can safely say state authority succeeded in combating and containing militancy effectively in three states-Mizoram, Punjab and Tripura.

In Mizoram when the MNF launched Operation Jericho on February 28, 1966 and captured several places including Aizwal and kept it under their full control for eight days, Indian Airforce was used and the fighters strafed on them. This was, perhaps, for the first time in the world at that time that a country used its air force on its own people. The standard of maintenance of Human Rights by the state authority then thus could very well be guessed. Yet, following several sets of negotiations in various parts of the world ultimately the MNF sat for final peace talks and peace indeed returned in Mizoram in 1986. (Later Sri Lankan authority also used air force on LTTE infested areas to flush them out of Killonecchi, Mullaitivu, and other northern parts of the island nation).

In Punjab the militancy- overtly aided by Pakistan under Benazir Bhutto- was fought ruthlessly and decisively by Punjab police led by KPS Gill. The expression - ‘Human Rights- virtually meant nothing then in Punjab. Excessive forces were used and by hardnosed policing the violence was contained.

But in Tripura though the police took the lead role in combating militancy the Human Rights violations were negligible. Offhand only one or two severe Human Rights violations come to mind - one being the Ujan Maidan in 1989 where tribal women were raped by some Assam Rifles jawans and the other being Kutnabari incident on November 6, 1999 where Tripura State Rifles personnel cold bloodedly killed three tribal youths following an ATTF ambush on their colleagues. Then there were some stray reports of Human Rights violations in Takumbari and Chhankhola areas. But in all the cases authorities took strong view and actions were taken against the erring personnel.

The state forces, while combating the non-state armed actors carrying out violence, are virtually left with only three options: First, arrest them and put them to trial in the court of law, second, force them to surrender under pressure and proactive operations of various kinds and help them start a new life with rehabilitation package, and third when both the first two options fail, engage them in encounter which may result in killing or wounding them.

A fallen body - even if it belongs to an insurgent, or Jihadi or a militant- means the basic of Human Rights of a human being to live a full life is essentially curtailed- even if a man in uniform is forced to do it in an encounter for a greater cause or to save many other innocents. Besides, killing cannot be done with a human face or in other words with sympathy. And this is the tragedy that comes haunting for all the combatants in a conflict zone. This is a fact inherent in Counter Insurgency or Counter terrorist operations.

ISI ‘SUB INSPECTOR'’- WHAT IS IT ANYWAY?

By Manas Paul

The local newspapers recently carried a news item on arrested ISI operative Munir Khan who had been produced before an Agartala court in July last. According to news reports, which ostensibly quoted from police docket, Khan told the investigating and interrogating cops that he was ‘Sub Inspector” of ISI.

If this was ‘true’ than there something indeed is seriously amiss.

The fact is there is no rank as “Sub Inspector” in ISI.

The ISI or ‘Inter Services Intelligence’ is essentially a military organization of Pakistan. It was formed in 1947 by a British military officer Maj. Gen R Cawthorn. The ISI –always commanded by Pak military generals at the rank ‘Lt General’- called Director General- is virtually a counterpart of military intelligence of India. Present Director General of ISI is Lt Gen. Ahmed Suja Pasha. Pakistan’s military chief General A. Kiyani had also been once the ISI chief.

The ISI is formed with two main components –one is military and the other is civil recruits. The military officers are deputed in the ISI for maximum three years so as to limit their influence. The civilians are recruited in the ISI through Federal Public Service Commission of Pakistan through intensive scrutiny, checks and cross checks in their past, ideological, religious, political, social beliefs and mindset. The civilian recruits are also given military rank but they are not allowed to hold the rank above ‘Major’-which are exclusively reserved for the direct military officers.

The ISI's has seven departments known as ‘ Joint Intelligence X’, ‘Joint Intelligence Bureau’, ‘Joint Counter Intelligence Bureau’, ‘Joint Intelligence North’, ‘Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous’, ‘Joint Signal Intelligence Bureau’ and ‘Joint Intelligence technical’.

Among them JIB and JIM are considered most powerful. While JIB looks after intelligence gathering –political and otherwise- it has sub departments, one among them specifically for India. JIN was also exclusively meant for Jammu and Kashmir while JIM is entrusted with the dirty jobs which include among others offensive espionage, sabotage, surveillance etc.

It is quite likely that Munir Khan was entrusted with the offensive mission under JIM.

The mission could be anything – from reactivating HUJI-B in an attempt to assassinate Sheikh Hasina either in Bangladesh or during her proposed Agartala visit, to reporting the ground level condition in view of the recent development relating to Indo-Bangla bilateral trade and imminent opening up of Ashuganj and even Chittagong port for Tripura, or cultivating disgruntled section (smugglers et al) that might get affected in case of new trade and transit opportunities, or even strengthening hawala racket for future use.

Besides, the ISI, like most of the intelligence services of the world, is not known for sending their own ranking officers in foreign country to work as ‘deep cover’ or ‘sleeper’ agent. The task is usually given to recruits – a common man selected carefully- from outside the organization after proper training indoctrination and acclimatization. This also gives the recruiting organization a scope for deniability in case of exposure or arrest.

Khan’s claim that he had been recruited from Bahawalpur of Punjab province in Pakistan fits in this context. That he was trained for three months by ISI in Bahawalpur and Multan is also believable. But none in his right mind would accept that ISI sent an ‘officer’-that too, a probationer- who had only three months training in espionage business to work in a far off place like Bangladesh-Tripura-Assam.

The claim that Khan was a ‘Sub Inspector’ of ISI is thus far from the truth. It is likely that Khan was bluffing and the cops had believed in it to incorporate his supposed ‘ISI rank’.

Such slip-if it really occurred in police docket-also does neither add to the image of the police nor in long run to the case when placed for trial in the court of law.